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Section C — Application Segments (C.1-C.4)Cv0.2 draft -> v1.0https://ccsa-council.com/en/standard/segments
C

Section C — Application Segments (C.1-C.4)

PCI DSS analogy

Analogous to PCI DSS SAQ variants — applicability by subject type


Part of the normative document: Section C Standard version: 0.2

Section C — Application Segments

C.0. Introduction

This section defines the applicability of the Section B requirements (8 domains) to each of the 4 segments of the crypto-asset market. Applicability is expressed by an M / R / N/A matrix (Mandatory / Recommended / Not Applicable) within each Section B domain (see the "Applicability summary table" block at the end of B.1 — B.8) and consolidated in this section.

Segments:

  • C.1 — Custodial wallets and custodians
  • C.2 — Non-custodial wallets (vendor wallet software)
  • C.3 — Crypto exchanges (CEX and DEX front-ends)
  • C.4 — Issuers of stablecoins, RWA tokens, fiat tokens

C.1. Custodial wallets and custodians

C.1.1. Segment definition

Organizations that hold customer crypto-assets under their own management of private keys. Includes:

  • Centralized exchange wallets (custody-side)
  • Dedicated custodians (Coinbase Custody, Anchorage, BitGo, Fireblocks Vault and the like)
  • Bank crypto-wallets operated by digital-financial-asset (DFA) operators
  • White-label custody services

C.1.2. Applicability of CCSA domains for C.1

DomainApplicabilityPrimary focus
B.1 Inventory & ClassificationMAll CCM categories (especially A, B, C, D, E, F)
B.2 GenerationMCold storage ceremony is critical
B.3 StorageMHSM / MPC + hot / warm / cold tiering
B.4 UsageMDual control + session security for customer wallets
B.5 Lifecycle ManagementMAll aspects
B.6 Wallet ArchitectureMArchitectural isolation of CCM by tier
B.7 Compromise DetectionMWatch-only monitoring + reconciliation
B.8 Personnel & Access ControlMBackground checks + SoD

All 8 domains are Mandatory for C.1. This is the strictest application segment.

C.1.3. Specific per-level requirements for C.1

AspectLevel 1Level 2Level 3
AUM threshold< $5M$5M – $500M> $500M
HSM / MPCRecommended (if AUM < $500K, a software vault is permitted with CC)MandatoryMandatory + geographic distribution
Multi-sig threshold for cold storage (Section B.6.1)2-of-33-of-54-of-7 with geographic distribution
Cold storage % AUM (Section B.3.3)≥ 65%≥ 85%≥ 95%
Session 2FA for signing (Section B.4.3)RequiredRequired + step-upRequired + DPoP
Compromise detection SLA (Section B.7.3)≤ 5 minutes≤ 1 minute≤ 30 seconds
Recovery RTO (Section B.5.3)≤ 72 hours≤ 24 hours≤ 4 hours
Background check level (Section B.8.1)StandardStandardEnhanced + continuous

C.2. Non-custodial wallets

C.2.1. Segment definition

Software or devices that provide the user with sole control over private keys:

  • Browser extension wallets (MetaMask, Rabby and the like)
  • Mobile wallets (Trust Wallet, Phantom and the like)
  • Desktop wallets (Electrum, Sparrow and the like)
  • Hardware wallets (Ledger, Trezor, Tangem and the like)
  • Smart wallet / Account Abstraction wallets

Subject of certification in C.2: the software vendor or hardware manufacturer of the wallet product. The end user is not subject to certification and is not a subject of the audit.

C.2.2. The dual nature of the C.2 scope

For C.2, the standard's requirements apply in two distinct contexts:

  • Vendor scope — requirements on the organization that develops the wallet product (employees, processes, infrastructure within the vendor): includes onboarding, offboarding, SoD, background checks, build infrastructure security, release management.
  • Device scope — requirements on the architecture of the wallet software on the end user's device: includes on-device entropy, secure storage in the Secure Enclave / StrongBox, the signing ceremony within the trusted boundary, recovery UX.

Neither of these scopes applies to the end user themselves. The user makes decisions about their own CCM (how often to rotate the seed, whether to use multi-sig) independently; the vendor is obliged to provide mechanisms and documentation, not to enforce policies on the user.

C.2.3. Applicability of CCSA domains for C.2

DomainApplicabilityScopePrimary focus
B.1 Inventory & ClassificationMVendor scope (device-architectural inventory)Documenting supported CCM categories and mechanisms
B.2 GenerationMDevice scopeOn-device generation, entropy guarantees, Secure Enclave use
B.3 StorageMDevice scopeSecure Enclave / StrongBox, anti-extraction protections
B.4 UsageMDevice scopeBiometric guard, transaction simulation, signing UX
B.5 Lifecycle ManagementMDevice scope + vendor scopeRecovery procedure for the user; user-initiated rotation UX
B.6 Wallet ArchitectureR (the vendor must support multi-sig as a feature)Device scopeMulti-sig support for institutional users — not enforcement on retail
B.7 Compromise DetectionRVendor scopeLimited applicability — vendor monitoring of its own build infrastructure and app integrity; end-user wallet compromise detection is on the user's side
B.8 Personnel & Access ControlM (vendor scope for employees)Vendor scopeInternal team controls for developers and release engineers

C.2.4. Unique requirements for C.2

Code security:

  • Open-source preferred (for community verification and code review)
  • Reproducible builds for App Store / Play Store releases
  • Code signing with a verified developer identity
  • Code obfuscation for proprietary parts (where applicable)

Protection against extraction:

  • Anti-tampering measures
  • Anti-screenshot protection when displaying the seed phrase in the UI
  • Jailbreak / root detection with degraded functionality (for mobile)
  • Anti-debugging measures

User education about CCM:

  • In-app warnings about seed phrase security
  • Anti-phishing measures (transaction simulation, address book with verified contacts)
  • Recovery guidance documentation, available without an internet connection

C.2.5. Specific per-level requirements for C.2

AspectLevel 1Level 2Level 3
User base size< 10K MAU10K – 1M MAU> 1M MAU
External penetration testRecommendedAnnualBi-annual
Bug bounty programRecommended$25K minimum pool$100K+ minimum pool
Independent code auditRecommendedAnnualContinuous (per release)
Secure Enclave / StrongBox usageRecommendedMandatoryMandatory + remote attestation
Reproducible buildsOptionalRequiredRequired + public transparency log

C.3. Crypto exchanges (CEX and DEX front-ends)

C.3.1. Segment definition

Trading platforms for crypto-assets, with respect to the protection of the CCM of their custody infrastructure:

  • Centralized exchanges (CEX) — custody side
  • DEX front-ends — management of signing keys for admin functions
  • OTC platforms — custody hot / warm / cold

Scope note: segment C.3 covers only the protection of CCM in the exchange infrastructure. Trading engine integrity, market manipulation prevention, order book security, listing standards, fair access — these are business processes and market integrity, outside the scope of CCSA (see Section 0.2.2).

C.3.2. Applicability of CCSA domains for C.3

DomainApplicabilityPrimary focus
B.1 Inventory & ClassificationMAll categories; especially D (session) for user wallets
B.2 GenerationMHSM / MPC ceremony
B.3 StorageMHot / warm / cold + session token storage
B.4 UsageMHardware-backed signing + session security for users
B.5 Lifecycle ManagementMAll aspects
B.6 Wallet ArchitectureMFull architectural isolation
B.7 Compromise DetectionMReal-time reconciliation
B.8 Personnel & Access ControlMBackground checks + SoD critical

All 8 domains are Mandatory for C.3, as for C.1.

C.3.3. Unique requirements for C.3 with respect to CCM

User wallets (custody-side):

  • Session tokens are protected as category D CCM (Section B.1.1)
  • Mandatory 2FA for signing operations (Section B.4.3)
  • Step-up authentication for high-value operations (Section B.4.3 Level 2+)

Internal operations:

  • Withdrawal time-locks (Section B.6.4)
  • Address whitelisting for institutional accounts (Section B.6.5)
  • Real-time watch-only monitoring of all hot / warm wallets (Section B.7.3)

C.3.4. Specific per-level requirements for C.3

AspectLevel 1Level 2Level 3
Daily volume< $1M$1M – $100M> $100M
Hot wallet % AUM≤ 10%≤ 5%≤ 1%
Cold storage % AUM≥ 65%≥ 85%≥ 95%
Session signing 2FARequiredRequired + step-upRequired + DPoP
Real-time monitoring SLA≤ 5 minutes≤ 1 minute≤ 30 seconds

C.4. Issuers of stablecoins, RWA tokens, fiat tokens

C.4.1. Segment definition

Organizations that issue tokens on a blockchain, with respect to the protection of the CCM of their issuance infrastructure:

  • Stablecoins (USDT, USDC, DAI and the like)
  • RWA tokens (real-world asset tokens)
  • Fiat tokens (currency-backed tokens)
  • Security tokens

Scope note: segment C.4 covers only the protection of mint / burn keys and the associated CCM. Reserve composition policy, audited reserves, Proof of Reserves, governance processes, regulatory disclosure, token holders' rights — these are finance, governance, and regulatory compliance domains, outside the scope of CCSA (see Section 0.2.2).

C.4.2. Applicability of CCSA domains for C.4

DomainApplicabilityPrimary focus
B.1 Inventory & ClassificationMMint / burn keys (cat E), recovery materials (cat F)
B.2 GenerationMCeremony for mint authority keys
B.3 StorageMHSM for mint keys + recovery distribution
B.4 UsageMMulti-person mint authorization (CCM protection)
B.5 Lifecycle ManagementMRotation of mint keys, recovery procedures
B.6 Wallet ArchitectureR (M if user-facing wallets exist)Wallet architecture applies only if user-facing wallets exist
B.7 Compromise DetectionMDetection of unauthorized mint / burn
B.8 Personnel & Access ControlMBackground checks for mint keyholders critical

C.4.3. Unique requirements for C.4 with respect to CCM

Mint / burn key protection:

  • Multi-sig is mandatory for mint / burn (Section B.6.1) — Mandatory regardless of market cap
  • Watch-only monitoring of all mint events (Section B.6.2)
  • Time-lock on mint > threshold (Section B.6.4)
  • Compromise detection for unauthorized mint events (Section B.7.3)

What CCSA does not cover for issuers:

  • Reserve composition policy and audited reserves — a separate compliance domain
  • Token holders' rights, redemption procedures — corporate governance
  • Smart contract audit (the issuance contract) — code security, a separate domain
  • Regulatory disclosure — regulatory compliance

C.4.4. Specific per-level requirements for C.4

AspectLevel 1Level 2Level 3
Market cap< $5M$5M – $100M> $100M
Mint multi-sig2-of-33-of-54-of-7 or higher
Mint time-lockNone for small mints (< 1% supply)24 hours for mint > 1% supply72 hours + governance approval
Mint key HSMRecommendedMandatoryMandatory + geographic distribution
Mint compromise detection SLA≤ 5 minutes≤ 1 minute≤ 30 seconds

C.5. Cross-segment rules

C.5.1. Multi-segment organizations

If an organization operates in several segments simultaneously (for example, exchange + custodian + issuer), the requirements of all applicable segments apply:

  • Compliance with the union of all Mandatory requirements
  • Common infrastructure requirements are verified once
  • A single ROC with a breakdown by segment

C.5.2. Sub-organizational segments

If different business units within a single organization operate in different segments, per-segment certification is possible:

  • Each business unit may have its own Level and AOC
  • Common CCM infrastructure requirements are verified once
  • Segregated reporting per segment

Rule for determining the overall entity level. If the organization is certified as a single entity (not per-segment), and the different segments yield different levels (for example, for C.1 the level is determined as L2 by AUM, while for C.3 the level is L3 by daily volume), then the overall entity level = max(per-segment levels). This also applies to different metrics within a single segment (AUM vs transaction volume): the strictest level is taken. If per-segment certification is chosen (the sub-organization route), each business unit is documented with its own level separately.

C.5.3. Applicability of carry-over in a multi-segment context

Where baseline certificates are present (see Section A), carry-over applies per requirement, not per segment. The same baseline (for example, PCI DSS Level 1) may cover the same common-infrastructure requirements (B.4.4 Privileged Access, B.7.1 Logging) for all of the organization's segments simultaneously.

C.5.4. Critical Requirements in a multi-segment context

For all 8 Critical Requirements (B.1.1, B.1.2, B.2.1, B.3.1, B.4.1, B.5.2, B.7.3, B.8.1 — see Section D.2.5), carry-over does not apply in any segment (per Section A.0.3). A multi-segment organization must undergo a full CCSA assessment of the Critical Requirements through Defined Approach Testing Procedures for each segment in scope. The Customized Approach for Critical Requirements is prohibited (Section 0.7.2); a Compensating Control for the four fully-forbidden Critical Requirements (B.1.1, B.1.2, B.5.2, B.7.3) is prohibited entirely (Section 0.8.2); for the remaining four (B.2.1, B.3.1, B.4.1, B.8.1) it is permitted only at Level 1 with Council approval (Section 0.8.3).

Sources

See Section 0.4 Normative References in the Front Matter.

The standard is under public consultation. If you have a comment on this section, state it against the requirement code.

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Draft v0.2 -> v1.0. Subject to change before 2027-01-01.